principles, the rule of law and good governance in Africa; [and] contribute to the stability of the continent' by focusing on debt issues and development assistance. The intention to cooperate in the defence field was made explicit at the Cahors Franco-British summit in February 2001. 10 St-Malo I and II did not, however, simply mark a discursive watershed. They also served as a catalyst for efforts to create a more meaningful institutional framework within which the Artemis was the first 'autonomous' EU military operation (that is, conducted without recourse to NATO assets) and the first ESDP operation outside Europe. France was the 'framework nation' for the operation and provided the operational headquarters and the majority-90 per cent-of the 1,400-strong force on the ground, although the UK sent a special operations unit, which played a crucial role in resurfacing the runway at Bunia as all supplies had to be flown in. The UK also provided invaluable support by persuading a reluctant Ugandan government to offer airport facilities at Entebbe. 17 The operation was limited in time (four months) and had a mandate to protect civilian life and stabilize the humanitarian situation in Bunia (eastern DRC) following the withdrawal of Ugandan forces and the inability of the UN The key point to stress is that neo-classical realism builds on the neo-realist assumption that both France and the UK are ultimately driven by concern over their relative power within the international system. Few would question that this assumption holds true in the case of France's unashamedly realist African policy. However, on the face of it, a neo-classical realist perspective would appear to ignore claims by Britain's New Labour government to be pursuing a valuedriven, ethically aware and often humanitarian approach towards the world's poorest continent.
In reality, however, neo-classical realism does take account of this 'idealism', seeing it as a useful means of mobilizing public support behind a policy that might not be intrinsically 47 Gideon Rose, 'Neo-classical realism and theories of foreign policy', World Thus the St-Malo process was launched at a key moment, when both France and the UK were anxious about their continuing status as permanent members of the UNSC and about their relative loss of influence, the former particularly in Africa and the latter in Europe. As a result, the two countries had complementary interests pushing them towards closer and mutually beneficial cooperation. Clearly, by working together in the security domain, these two middleranking powers, with similar levels of defence expenditure, could increase their influence over In the process, the overall amount of funding for these activities was cut and the budget for The signs are that cooperation will continue to be patchy for the foreseeable future. There is, for example, evidence to suggest that the French are increasingly interested in developing a 61 Elowson, 'The joint Africa-EU strategy', p. 27, n. 48. stronger security relationship with the US in Africa, notably in the Sahel. 62 On the British side, with the 2010 general election returning a coalition government led by a Conservative Party that has already distanced itself from mainstream centre-right parties in continental Europe{?}, there is reason to expect that the UK will play a much less constructive role in future ESDP missions.
Furthermore, almost any future British administration is likely to consider with trepidation the idea, propounded by France, that such missions, given their sheer number and complexity, require the establishment of a separate European HQ operating autonomously from NATO. At the same time, however, future governments in both countries will be under pressure to make savings, which may push them towards increased burden-sharing in certain situations. Moreover, the creation of the European External Action Service in the aftermath of Lisbon will increase pressure for policy coordination as its role increases and member states seek to cut the costs of individual diplomatic missions.
62 Hitherto, this relationship seems to have been an exclusive one, although in 2009 the UK government announced its intention to reopen an embassy in Mali in response to the execution of a British national and the wider threat of terrorism, migration and organized crime.
